Labour transnationalism is by now a well researched subject, especially in multinational corporations (MNCs) in Europe. Much literature has analyzed the emergence of labour transnationalism and its structural forms (Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie and Winchester 2006; Müller, Platzer and Rüb 2004) , its embeddedness in national and local industrial relations arrangements (Hancké 2000; Lillie and Martínez Lucio 2004) , and the role of the sector and European integration (Marginson 2000) , but it remains unclear how it becomes strategic for worker representatives facing threats of disinvestment. Do trade unionists view it as a tool for in-plant, national, or transnational action? Could it limit the intense competition behind concession bargaining?
We examine labour transnationalism at the automotive firms DaimlerChrysler, General Motors (GM), Ford/Visteon and Volkswagen (VW). Common to these four firms is strong collective labour representation, as indicated by high union density and broad, overlapping representation bodies such as labour unions, works councils, supervisory boards, European Works Councils (EWCs) and, in two firms, World Works Councils (WWCs). These companies all began a restructuring process in the 1990s, including the building of new production capacity, the closure and downsizing of older plants, the outsourcing and spinning off parts production, and the purchase or construction of new plants. During this period, managers set up transnational in-firm competition in various ways, from blatant whipsawing -in which management plays plants off against each other in order to extract concessions from labour -to more subtle comparisons and benchmarking, and union-side international cooperation intensified in response.
Labour transnationalism, however, plays out differently at each firm. At
DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen, we see global-level information sharing, and, to some extent, global standard setting over labour rights. Here, labour transnationalism is a matter of providing a minimal level of information and collective rights for foreign colleagues. These works councils, however, have done little to prevent competition between locations. At two other firms, Ford and GM, we see European-level coordination and bargaining. While unionists at GM and Ford have used worked to influence restructuring at a in Europe, their colleagues at VW and DaimlerChrysler have extended transnationalism beyond Europe. At GM, European worker representatives have organised transnational mobilisations to resist plant closures and dismissals.
We base these case studies on 197 semi-structured interviews between 2003 and 2007, 1 as well as archival sources and press reports. Although most transnational activity is confined to Europe, we examine its global extension, where applicable. Our narratives begin in the 1990s with labour-side responses to international competition.
Examining labour transnationalism in MNCs is becoming important as they expand. The ratio of outward Foreign Direct Investments from MNCs to total global
Gross Domestic Product more than doubled between 1996 and 2004, from 11% to 24% (UNCTAD 2005) . If trade unionism extended itself to the national level in the late 19 th 1 We conducted these interviews in Germany, the US, Spain, and the UK. In each country we spoke to national-level and in-plant trade unionists responsible for each firm (including, where possible, different caucuses and unions). In Germany, Spain and the US, we also spoke to managers, workers, regional trade union officials and academics. In Germany and Spain we talked as well to employer association representatives.
to mid 20 th century, as nation-wide firms, states and markets became more important, it is worth asking whether an analogous process is underway in the 21 st century. We define labour transnationalism as the spatial extension of trade unionism through the intensification of cooperation between trade unionists across countries using transnational tools and structures.
This paper begins with a review of the literature on labour transnationalism, followed by a preview of our evidence. Then we offer an explanation for the different patterns of labour transnationalism, emphasising the interaction between management and labour in the context of the company structure. Of particular importance are management's ability and willingness to whipsaw and the orientations of worker representatives. The latter, we suggest, can be classified as political entrepreneurship and co-management. The following empirical section consists of four case studies on labour transnationalism in multinational automotive companies. Finally, we provide a comparative assessment of the case studies and conclude that, although competition and concessions and within-plant job retention remain important, international trade union cooperation has reshaped employment relations within these MNCs.
Labour transnationalism and the internationalisation of firms
The internationalisation of markets and firms has transformed labour relations. In manufacturing, unions grew up in order to prevent 'ruinous competition', as local and regional product and labour markets were supplanted by national ones (Commons 1909 ).
In the first half of the 20 th century they began to consolidate themselves by accepting the rules of national industrial relations systems. By the late 20 th century, as imports began to penetrate these national markets, as corporations established production locations around the world, and as collective bargaining began to lose its ability to provide both competitiveness and worker well-being, unions in the Global North had increasing difficulty sustaining their members' wage levels.
The notion that workers would coordinate across national boundaries in response to globalisation has not been self-evident to industrial relations theorists. To the contrary, some writers have suggested that, in the face of international markets, unions could take advantage of the decentralisation of business activity, either at the regional level (Piore and Sabel 1984) or at the in-plant level (Katz 1993) . Others have argued that national institutions would continue to protect workers, because of the interests of employers in stability (Thelen 2001) or comparative institutional advantages (Hall and Soskice 2001) .
In the mid-1990s, Turner (1996) argued that the structural preconditions for labour transnationalism existed, at least in Europe, but had not yet been filled out by action. Since then, a literature has grown up on this process, addressing the globalisation of industries (Anner et al 2006) and corporate structures (Müller, Platzer and Rüb 2004) ; the Europeanisation of social policymaking (Keller and Platzer 2003) ; and even -in the case of seafarers -negotiated global wage minima (Lillie 2006) . This literature emphasises the opportunities for labour transnationalism and sees EWCs as 'vehicles for labour-oriented networking' (Martínez Lucio and Weston 2004: 41) and the globalisation of firms as a potential stimulus for 'organisational learning' by unions (Kädtler and Sperling, 2002) .
Other writers identify constraints. For example, Wolfgang Streeck (1998) argued that EWCs were not transnational, but rather extensions of national industrial relations systems that articulated national or local interests. Hancké (2000) argued that, in the European automotive industry, EWCs tended to facilitate, rather than impede, management-led restructuring, by giving worker representatives information to use in local productivity coalitions. Beyond the auto industry, observers found that the Europeanisation of in-firm industrial relations was not connected to an extension of collective bargaining (Lecher, Nagel and Platzer 1999) , that managers were using EWCs to generate consent for downsizing (Tuckman and Whitall 2002) , and that the actions of trade unionists remained shaped by national identities (Timming 2006) . Moreover, as Dølvik (1997) showed, national unions have preferred to serve their members at home and resisted a transfer of power to the European Trade Union Confederation.
BMW's sale of Rover in 2000 seemed to confirm this scepticism. Having bought British automaker Rover in 1994 in hopes of entering a mass-production market, BMW managers had, five years on, failed to increase Rover's market share. As it became clear that management wanted to break up Rover, international relations between worker representatives became tense. The works council knew management's intentions because of German co-determination rules and in-firm co-management practices; British worker representatives, by contrast, were kept in the dark. BMW sold one plant to Ford, retained two plants, and handed the largest plant -which was eventually closed -to a consortium of investors (Armour and Deakin 2000; Tuckman and Whittall 2006; Villiers, 2001 ).
British worker representatives at Rover arguably lacked the information they were entitled to under national law, never mind the additional leverage supposedly provided by the EWC. Although a transnational structure existed, it did not alleviate the conflicts of interest between national unionists or compensate for the varying degrees of privilege in their access to management.
Since then, however, several events have raised doubts about the arguments of the sceptics. First, the EWC at GM has organised days of action, including work stoppages by as many as 40,000 workers, to pull management into European-level bargaining (Costa and Rehfeldt 2007 
Explaining labour transnationalism
We argue that the forms of labour transnationalism depend on the interaction between management and labour strategies in the context of the company structure; of particular importance are management's whipsawing practices and labour's orientations as comanagers or political entrepreneurs. This argument is actor-centred and emphasises the strategies of management and labour but also recognises that actors have built structures with implications for future action. Once established, European and World Works Councils, production networks (platforms), and the proximity of worker representatives to corporate headquarters all affect the labour-management interaction.
( 
Management: Transnational whipsawing and platform strategies
Two sets of international management strategies -the production strategy and labour relations strategy -are crucial in shaping labour transnationalism. As lean production has taken hold in the industry, production has become more standardised and locations more comparable. 'Coercive comparisons', enabled by systematic benchmarking of production sites, has long been central to management's bargaining strategy (Mueller and Purcell 1992) allocate works council funds to their projects), both are guided more by a political concern for labour rights than by fears of whipsawing.
The merger led to a deepening of international ties due to uncertainty felt on both sides of the Atlantic. Although management promised a 'merger of equals', noticeable changes began to take place. In Germany, management introduced 'lean production' techniques developed in the U.S. German works councillors doubt that the company would shift work to smaller plants in the global south, because these seem to specialise in specific markets. The only parallel production is with the C-class, produced both in Sindelfingen (in BadenWürttemberg) and Bremen (in northern Germany); otherwise, threats are limited to future investment decisions or relatively small amounts of work. While Sindelfingen and
Bremen employ about 30,000 and 15,500 workers respectively, the South African plant making right-handed C-class (mainly for the British market) has fewer than 4000 workers, and the Brazilian plant making the A-class, 1500. Because Mercedes factories tend to specialise in unique products, worker representatives believe that company lacks the capacity to make good on major threats to shift work across borders (ibid). Europe. After cooperating for more than 10 years, the Spanish unions believed that they could count on their European colleagues in a similar crisis. The plant closure in Azambuja was not prevented, but the EWC helped to negotiate a redundancy agreement.
Volkswagen: International information sharing and paternalistic solidarity
VW is a German-based firm with global headquarters and much of its production in Wolfsburg and Ingolstadt (Audi). It was among the first German companies to expand production internationally (e.g. Brazil 1953 , South Africa 1956 , Mexico 1964 , Belgium 1971 , Yugoslavia 1972 , USA 1976 , and China 1984 and employs about 340,000
employees worldwide, about half of whom work in Germany. Other important European however, this has not led to transnational mobilisation or bargaining.
( Table 2 about here)
Comparative Assessment
Similarities across our cases have to do with the characteristics of the auto industry, which is dominated by a few, powerful multi-national companies competing against each other in price-and quality-competitive markets. In order to keep up with projected consumer demand, firms tend to over-invest in production capacity, which increases costs and reduces profits. In order to continue making profits, they reduce personnel costs through layoffs, concessions, and plant closures. Most managers and trade unionists -whether co-managers or political entrepreneurs -we interviewed understood these pressures as the facts of the situation, objective constraints with implications for action.
Nevertheless, the shape of labour transnationalism differs from firm to firm, depending on the interaction of management and labour strategies in the context of the company structure. At VW and Daimler, management nurtured co-management by offering worker representatives considerably more access to the decision making process and more resources (information, offices, staff, etc.) than required by law. In contrast, GM's European management used transnational whipsawing to divide workers by location and extract concessions, hereby triggering cross-border labour-side coordination.
Management's ability to whipsaw depended on the extent to which redundant, comparable capacities existed along production platforms; these were greater at GM and VW than at Ford or DaimlerChrysler.
Conclusion
Some of the literature on EWCs has stressed their instrumental character for management and union-side co-managers seeking improved competitiveness (Hancke 2000) . Others see in labour transnationalism a potential site of organizing with some degree of independence, a rebuilding of union roles and an expansion of labour-side networking at an international scale (Anner et al 2005) . We see truth in both of these perspectives.
Even at contentious moments, labour transnationalism in the automotive industry is It would be a mistake to treat labour transnationalism as an extension of national arrangements or an instrument of in-plant co-managers. While worker representatives have internalised the need to be competitive, in cases of transnational bargaining or social codes of conduct, worker representatives have struggled for social goods beyond national economic self-interest. While managers sometimes agree to international negotiations, in other cases they prefer local or national agreements, and, like the current struggle over GM's delta platform, EWCs have to push them into negotiations. Lastly, while job retention and concession bargaining are common to all these firms, concessions can be solidaristic, like at GM and Visteon, where the goal was to 'share the pain'
internationally.
For commentators on EWCs in the mid-to-late 1990s, it was hardly self-evident that there would be European-level bargaining or mobilisation. Indeed, institutional industrial relations theory is still grappling with how the agency of workers and intense, wage-based competition both matter. In-firm labour transnationalism may not overcome competition, but it has introduced new principles of solidarity into the competitive environment of the international auto industry. Müller, Platzer and Rüb (2004) .
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